血战太平洋
新西兰外长阐述奥库斯立场被抗议打断：“如果你想找麻烦，那么你来对地方了”_我的网站
A | Kenny 报道 5月1日，新西兰外交部长Winston Peters在惠灵顿发表演说，称新西兰应考虑加入奥库斯第二支柱所带来的技术收益。
B |
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future.
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected]
。他还批评前工党政府对奥库斯协议的突然转变立场。 尽管演说被一位佩戴口罩的女性抗议者打断，但Peters仍然确认了两点：新西兰没有收到加入该协议的邀请；政府离做出决定“还有一条很长的路要走”。 Advertise with us 他说新西兰政府正在就是否加入奥库斯协议进行”信息收集讨论”，新西兰必须更好地了解与该协议进行技术合作的潜在机会，权衡经济和安全利益，才能决定是否符合国家利益。 Peters在国会新西兰国际事务研究所发表的这段演说被认为是联合政府的官方表态。
C | （图源：Getty） 奥库斯协议是由澳大利亚、英国和美国在2021年9月宣布成立的军事外交安全合作伙伴关系，其首要目的是由英美武装澳大利亚，帮助其在南太平洋建立一支核动力潜艇舰队。 外界多认为奥库斯协议的目的是为了对抗影响力不断上升的中国，而中国一直强烈批评奥库斯破坏地区和平与稳定。 奥库斯协议的第二支柱主要是分享先进的非核军事技术。美英澳三国现已提出接收其它国家加入第二支柱的可能性。被认为可能收到邀请的潜在合作伙伴包括日本、韩国、新西兰和加拿大。 Peters在演说中批评了工党在奥库斯协议上前恭后倨的态度转变。他说工党早在2021年10月也就是奥库斯协议“官宣”后不久就开始讨论第二支柱事宜。 “让我们明确一点，第二支柱的讨论是……之前由工党发起的，这就是为什么我们一直声称是在延续前工党政府发起的进程。” “部长们在2021年10月首次收到关于新西兰与奥库斯合作可能性的建议。
D | ” “2023年，经过近两年的仔细权衡，工党总理与外交部长和国防部长一起，批准官员与奥库斯合作伙伴开启第二支柱范围和架构的对话。堪培拉、伦敦和华盛顿的信息收集讨论并不是自发进行的。
E | ” “工党政府授权官员进行的这些活动，该选择与前总理Hipkins去年的声明一致：’我们身处在一个战略性地区’，”Peters说。 Peters强调新西兰的无核立场不变，并且构成任何参与的“关键先决条件”。 工党一直称政府对奥库斯的官方措词已经从中立转变为支持，但Peters澄清了这一点。他说政府的“信息收集仍处于初期阶段，而评论员和反对者在第二支柱上的立场远远超前于政府”。 “批评者完全否定第二支柱，他们声称我们因为意识形态原因正在放弃独立外交政策。” 但Peters说这样的声音带有反美主义倾向，“独立对他们来说就只意味着对美国说不”。
F | （图源：NZ Herald） 这次演说中就出现了一位高举“要民主不要奥库斯”牌子的抗议者。 “我再说一次，请您坐下，对其他听众表现出一些尊重，”Peters在台上说。
G | “能帮我一个忙吗？可以离开房间吗？” 抗议者摇摇头，然后被保安护送离开。 “就像猫王唱的，’如果你想找麻烦，那么你来对地方了’，”目送抗议者离开后，Peters点评道。 相关阅读：新西兰公布奥库斯协议进展：只要高科技，不针对中国 注：本文为编译/原创，欢迎转发分享；但严禁复制等未经授权的非法使用。
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